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Ronald Reagan arrived at the White House in 1981 armed with a
quixotic strategy for reducing the size and scope of the federal gov-
ernment and for closing the budget deficit. The President's strategy
required a massive reduction in taxes and, simultaneously, even
greater reductions in expenditures. But by 1984, President Reagan
had failed to translate his commitment to minimalist government
into reality.' Although President Reagan sought and achieved large
tax reductions in 1981, his budget proposals, due to sustained real
growth in defense expenditures, actually increased gross federal
spending.
The Reagan Administration's initial approach failed, in part, be-
cause it ignored the strength of coalitions of beneficiaries, service
providers, activists, and members of Congress, all of whom had defi-
nite interests in the preservation and expansion of particular pro-
grams. 2 Members of the Reagan Administration erroneously had
assumed that an arithmetical imperative would constrain federal ex-
penditures once the President was successful in choking off the reve-
nue sources that finance federal programs.3 Despite the failure of
its earlier efforts, the Administration did not give up its hope of
somehow reducing the size and the scope of the federal sector. In
!. During President Reagan's first term, federal spending consumed an average of
23.4% of the gross national product (GNP), a proportion significantly greater than the
19% figure the Administration thought it could achieve when it first took office. Execu-
tive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget [hereinafter collectively
OMB], Historical Tables Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1987,
Table 1.2(2) (1986). In setting the 19% target, the Administration assumed that it could
roll back domestic spending to 1970 levels. D. Stockman, The Triumph of Politics 148
(1986). The President's plan to eliminate the deficit fared no better than his plan to curb
spending. In 1980, the federal deficit was $74 billion, but by 1984, the deficit had more
than doubled to $185 billion. OMB, Historical Tables, supra, at Table 1.1(2).
2. Privatization theorists, such as Stuart Butler, have criticized the President's "sup-
ply side view of the budget process." As noted by Butler, the flaw in Reagan's first term
approach was that it "ignore[d] the demand side of the political equation. It over-
look[ed] the subtle process by which government programs grow and the fact that they
are sustained by powerful coalitions." S. Butler, Privatizing Federal Spending: A Strat-
egy to Eliminate the Budget Deficit 9 (1985).
3. See D. Stockman, supra note 1, at 147.
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President Reagan's second term, 4 the Administration embraced
"privatization" as a new, supplementary5 strategy for minimalist
government and deficit reduction.
"Privatization" defies easy definition; advocates do not agree on a
single definition, nor do they agree on the practical limitations of
privatization as a policy. 6 However, privatization advocates share a
common assumption, whether grounded in ideology or in econom-
ics, that the public sector is too large and that it engages in activities
more properly or more efficiently performed by the private sector.
This belief is echoed in the Administration's own definition of priva-
tization. It defines privatization as:
a strategy to shift the production of goods and services from the Gov-
ernment to the private sector in order to reduce Government expendi-
tures and to take advantage of the efficiencies that normally result
when services are provided through the competitive marketplace.
7
From this simple definition, it would appear that privatization
avoids the political hazards of expenditure reductions. The ostensi-
ble goal of privatization is not necessarily to deny consumers the
4. The Reagan Administration proposed a number of specific privatization measures
during its first term. Those measures included: the Justice Department's proposal to
privatize the federal prison system, the Department of Interior's efforts to sell federal
lands, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's housing voucher plan.
The Reagan Administration, however, first articulated "privatization" as a general, uni-
fied strategy for reducing the size and scope of the federal government in its fiscal year
(FY) 1987 budget proposal. OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
1987 M-6-9 (Budget Message of the President).
A variety of privatization initiatives have been featured prominently in the Administra-
tion's last two budget proposals. The Administration's FY 1987 and FY 1988 privatiza-
tion proposals included: (1) the sale of certain tangible federal assets, including Conrail,
Amtrak, two Naval Petroleum Reserve oil fields, five Power Marketing Administrations,
and "excess" real property, not yet identified, valued at $800 million; and (2) the sale of
a number of federal loan portfolios, including phase-out of the Rural Electrification Ad-
ministrations. OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1988 2-45-
51 [hereinafter OMB, 1988 Budget]; OMB, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1987, supra. Thus far, the Administration has sold certain government loans,
but its most publicized sale has been the sale of Conrail. See generally Selby, "Inside the
Conrail Deal," Institutional Investor, Apr. 1987, at 95.
5. "Privatization is a natural counterpart to other administration initiatives-such as
federalism, deregulation, and an improved tax system-that seek to return the Federal
government to its proper role." OMB, 1988 Budget, supra note 4, at 2-44.
6. For an analysis of the different theoretical perspectives on privatization, see supra
Starr, The Meaning of Privatization 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 6 (1988).
For arguments advocating privatization in the United States, see E. Savas, Privatizing
the Public Sector: How to Shrink the Government (1982); S. Butler, supra note 2;
Hanke, The Theory of Privatization, in The Privatization Option, A Strategy to Shrink
the Size of Government I (S. Butler ed. 1985).
For a look at the meaning of privatization in an international context, see "Privitisa-
tion, Everybody's Doing It, Differently," The Economist, Dec. 21, 1985, at 69.
7. OMB, 1988 Budget, supra note 4, at Supp. 2-38.
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goods and services produced currently by government, but to find
private, more efficient ways to supply the same goods and services.
Despite this benign definition, privatization in practice does not al-
ways replace Government provision with private provision. Some
privatization measures do result in the withdrawal of the good or
service from certain constituencies, and hence confront the same
political resistance as expenditure reductions. Whether privatiza-
tion measures simply replace one method of delivering goods and
services with a more cost-effective alternative or lead to reallocation
or withdrawal of those goods and services altogether depends on
the type of inefficiency the particular proposal is designed to
correct.
This Current Topic examines two of the Administration's priva-
tization proposals, programs that were designed to correct different
types of inefficiency. Increased contracting-out of commercial activ-
ities attempts to correct inefficiencies in production; the privatiza-
tion of federal credit programs attempts to correct perceived
inefficiencies in supply. The objective of this Current Topic is to
examine these two proposals on their own terms, that is, to examine
whether implementation of these programs can lead to more effi-
cient production or more efficient supply, and to demonstrate the
difficulties inherent in both strategies. Contracting-out, for exam-
ple, may result in increased efficiency as the Administration claims;
however, there are a number of institutional barriers that make
these gains short-lived, if indeed they materialize at all. The Admin-
istration's proposals to privatize federal credit programs, however,
are more problematic. They cannot be justified plausibly on
grounds of increased efficiency; rather they can be justified only as
an ideological choice as to who receives credit.
I. Two Types of Inefficiency
The Administration's privatization proposals target two types of
inefficiency: inefficiency in production and inefficiency in supply.
Inefficiency in production relates to the process of producing goods
and services. The assertion is that a given supply of inputs, capital,
and labor will produce more output when the inputs are privately
owned than when government purchases the inputs, through own-
ership of capital assets or employment of workers. In other words,
private, competitive production is more cost-efficient than govern-
ment production. The Administration's proposal to increase con-
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tracting-out of commercial activities emphasizes cost-efficient
production.
The general phenomenon of contracting-out is a strategy of par-
tial privatization.8 It accepts the premise that government is an ap-
propriate purchaser of a particular good or service, and that
government financing or provision is proper; contracting-out only
addresses the issue of whether government is a proper producer of
the good or service. Moving production from one government
agency to another, or leaving production with the original agency,
does nothing to change the character or scope of the federal sector.
At most, it may reduce the cost of government production. Reduc-
ing the cost of government, even if not the scope of goods produced
by the government, is one goal of privatization, of course; complete
privatization, however, allows the private sector not only to produce
certain goods and services, but also to decide whether to produce
those goods and services at all.
The second type of inefficiency relates not to the process of pro-
duction but to the process of deciding how much and what to pro-
duce. The assertion here is that governmental institutions will
produce a sub-optimal amount of goods and services because these
institutions have a bias toward oversupply. In other words, there is
an inefficient bias toward too much government whether govern-
ment plays the role of producer or simply finances the private pro-
duction of goods and services. The Administration's proposals for
privatizing federal credit programs seek to correct such perceived
inefficiencies in supply by abdicating the decision to supply credit to
the private sector. The following two sections examine how the
contracting-out policies of this Administration and its federal credit
reform policies attempt to correct these two types of inefficiency,
and the shortcomings of these approaches.
I. Contracting-Out
A major thrust of the Administration's privatization strategy is the
aggressive implementation of the Commercial Activities Program, a
8. But cf. Sundquist, Privatization: No Panacea for What Ails Government, in Public-
Private Partnership: New Opportunities for Meeting Social Needs 303, 307 (H. Brooks,
L. Liebman, & C. Schelling eds. 1984) (contracting-out is the truest form of privatization
because "[tlhe responsibility is not shifted, only the actual performance of the work").
See also Kolderie, The Two Different Concepts of Privatization, 46 Pub. Admin. Rev. 285
(1986) (government performs two distinct functions: (1) policy decisions to provide a





program established by OMB Circular A-76 (A-76) for contracting-
out commercial activities to the private sector. The A-76 program
accounts for only a portion of all government contracts; it is empha-
sized here because the A-76 program, unlike other types of govern-
ment contracting programs, has a built-in mechanism for measuring
the relative productive efficiencies of the private sector vis-i-vis the
public sector.
A-76 sets forth the government's policy of relying, where possi-
ble, on the private sector to produce those goods and services
needed by the federal government. It states:
In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with
its citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by indi-
vidual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national eco-
nomic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been and
continues to be the general policy of the Government to rely on com-
mercial sources to supply the products and services the Government
needs.9
The A-76 policy predates President Reagan's adoption of priva-
tization by over 30 years.' 0 However, the Reagan Administration is
the first to seek vigorous implementation of A-76, a policy previous
administrations have virtually ignored.'' Moreover, the policy ex-
pressed by Circular A-76 is identical to the principles underlying the
Administration's privatization strategy. The Administration uses
language almost identical to that quoted above in a recent Office of
Management and Budget analysis to describe the principle underly-
ing its privatization strategy:
[G]overnment should not compete with the private sector in supplying
ordinary goods and services .... Candidates for privatization should
include any Government operation that sells goods or services in com-
9. OMB Circular No. A-76 (rev.), 48 Fed.Reg. 37,110, 37,114 4a (Aug. 16, 1983).
10. The policy of contracting-out commercial activities was announced in the Bureau
of the Budget Bulletins in 1955, 1957, and 1960. The Office of Management and
Budget (Bureau of the Budget's successor) reissued the policy as OMB Circular No. A-
76 in 1966. It was revised in 1967, 1979, and 1983. Id. at 4b. In 1981, the program's
name was changed from the Commercial/Industrial Type Activities Program ("CITA")
to avoid confusion with the Comprehensive Employment Training Act ("CETA").
Dempsey, Contracting Out Under OMB Circular No. A-76 in the Department of De-
fense, 16 Nat'l Contract Mgmt. J. 41 (1982), reprinted in 19 Y.B. of Procurement Articles
1009, 1011 (1982).
11. For a discussion of the history of Circular A-76, see Implementation of Circular
A-76: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on
Post Office and Civil Service, 98th Cong., 2nd S,:ss. 2-11 (1984) (testimony of William
Russell, Chairman, Business Alliance on Government Competition). Between 1983-85,
the number of contracts awarded under the A-76 program increased by 10%. CBO,
Contracting Out: Potential for Reducing Federal Costs vii (June 1987) [hereinafter
CBO, Contracting Out].
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petition with the private sector or that provides goods or services that
could be offered by the private sector.'
2
The A-76 program attempts to correct inefficiencies in production
by introducing the competitive discipline of the private market into
government bureaucracies. The process by which competition is in-
troduced, however, encounters serious obstacles that are inherent in
bureaucratic institutions. The Reagan Administration claims to
have already realized substantial savings from its emphasis on the A-
76 program. To evaluate whether the Reagan Administration's use
of the A-76 procedure has yielded and can yield the savings claimed
for it, it is necessary briefly to consider how the A-76 program actu-
ally works.
A. The A-76 Procedure 13
The A-76 process begins with a review of all operations within
each federal agency to determine which activities are commercial in
nature and which are inherently governmental.' 4 Under A-76, only
activities classified as commercial in nature may be contracted-out.
A-76 defines a commercial good or service by two standards:
(1) there must be a commercial source capable of providing a good
or service comparable to the good or service produced by the gov-
ernment; (2) no activity, regardless of the availability of commercial
alternatives, can be contracted-out if it is an inherently governmen-
tal function. 15 A-76 goes on to define a governmental function as
one that "require[s] either the exercise of discretion in applying
12. OMB, 1988 Budget, Special Analyses 2-38 (1987) (emphasis in original) [herein-
after OMB, Special Analyses].
13. For other summaries of the A-76 review procedure, see generally, CBO,
Contracting Out, supra note 11, at 1-6; OMB Circular A-76: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-12 (1985) (statement of Col. James M. Schroeder, Director,
Department of the Army, Commercial Activities Division) [hereinafter Hearings Before
Human Resources Subcomm.].
14. Certain federal activities are exempt from A-76 review by statute and/or by spe-
cific provisions in A-76 itself. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C.A. § 5010(c)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1987)
(prohibiting Veteran's Administration health care facilities from contracting-out direct
patient care or activities incident to direct patient care); Volunteers in the Parks Act of
1969, Amendment, Pub. L. No. 98-540, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (98 Stat.)
2718 (defining "management and regulation of natural resources on Federal lands" as
an inherently governmental function, thereby exempting them from A-76 review); 10
U.S.C. § 2304 (1987) (note exempting core logistic functions of Army, Air Force, Navy,
Marines, Defense Logistic Agency, and Defense Mapping Agency from contracting-out);
OMB Circular No. A-76 (rev.), supra note 9, at 8b, 8c (authorizing the Secretary of
Defense to exempt commercial activities for national security reasons and authorizing
retention of in-house performance of commercial activities in hospitals operated by the
government if in the best interests of direct patient care).




Government authority or the use of value judgments in making deci-
sions for the Government.'" Of course, all A-76 contracts are lim-
ited to goods and services in support of governmental functions.' 7
The purpose of the second A-76 standard is to distinguish between
goods and services that are inherently "governmental" and those
that may properly be considered wholly "commercial" (private)
even when used as an input of government or when financed by
government. "I
If a good or service is defined as inherently governmental, then it
must be produced by the government. On the other hand, once an
agency determines that a good or service is commercial, the agency
cannot begin or continue production of the good or service unless it
determines that a private firm cannot produce the same good or ser-
vice at lower cost to the government. To determine whether a good
or service can be supplied to the government more efficiently by the
private sector, A-76 requires agencies to estimate the cost of pro-
ducing the good or service in-house (i.e., using federal employees
and government facilities) and compare the in-house estimate
against bids submitted by private-sector contractors.
An in-house estimate is developed in several stages, two of which
are particularly significant. In the first, the agency develops a com-
plete description of the good or service under consideration, known
as a Performance Work Statement (PWS), which a team comprised
of government management analysts reviews to identify opportuni-
ties for increased efficiency in government production.' 9 The re-
view team also describes the Most Efficient Organization (MEO) for
providing or performing a certain service. The MEO describes a
streamlined government operation, incorporating management im-
16. Id..at 6e.
17. Circular A-76 provides for procurement of commercial services that the govern-
ment will use for itself, as opposed to services or goods that the government may
purchase for someone else. OMB Circular A-76 (rev.). supra note 9. at 1 4a.
18. For example, the provision of Armed Services for the national defense is an in-
herently governmental function that may be supported by a myriad of commercial activi-
ties such as the laundering of uniforms. Under A-76, the government may not contract
out the provision of service personnel, but it may contract for certain support services.
such as laundry. See id. at t 6e.
19. The Department of Defense initially used private sector consultants to evaluate
activities under the A-76 review procedure. Now that the A-76 process is firmly under-
way in that department, in-house personnel conduct nearly all A-76 reviews. Civilian
agencies, on the other hand, have only begun to implement the A-76 program, and thus
they rely on private consulting contractors to conduct A-76 reviews. Civilian agencies
may be expected to depend on in-house personnel as the A-76 program becomes more
familiar and entrenched. Hearings Before Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13,
at 254-55 (statement of David . Muzio, Deputy Associate Director, Office of Federal
Procurement Policy).
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provement techniques and possibly proposing reductions in the
government work force. It is this MEO report, not the report
describing actual agency production methods and costs, that is used
to estimate the cost of government production.20 In the second
stage, the agency solicits bids from the private sector. If a private
contractor can underbid the agency's MEO-based price estimate by
10%, the commercial activity must be contracted-out.
21
B. The Potential for Expenditure Reductions
The Reagan Administration claims that substantial savings have
been realized by the A-76 program to date, and predicts that even
greater savings will result from increased implementation. Accord-
ing to a 1981 Administration estimate, the federal government per-
forms commercial activities valued at approximately $20 billion each
year.22 Of that $20 billion, the Administration estimated that ap-
proximately $6 billion worth of activities could be performed by the
private sector without interfering with government programs or im-
plicating national security.2 3 The Administration predicted that by
subjecting eligible commercial activities to A-76 review, it could
save $1 billion by FY 1988.24 This estimate includes savings that
would inure as a result of the review process itself, even if some
activities subjected to review are not, as a result, contracted-out.
The mere promise of A-76 review is claimed to encourage greater
efficiency in government. The threat that contracting-out poses to
federal employees is considered an inducement for them to stream-
line their operations in preparing the MEO. If federal employees
"win" the bid, and the activity is not converted to contract, "agen-
cies are expected to make improvements identified in management
20. CBO, Contracting Out, supra note 11, at 4.
21. Id. The 10% margin is a "conversion differential" designed to take account of
costs and disruptions that occur when a government function is contracted-out to the
private sector. Id. The contractor's bid is also adjusted to reflect the costs of adminis-
tering the contract. And the agency must adjust the contractor's bid to reflect the in-
come tax advantage that accrues to the federal government when work is contracted out.
Id. at 4-5.
22. OMB/OFPP, Enhancing Governmental Productivity Through Competition:
Targeting for Annual Savings of One Billion Dollars By 1988 1 (1984) [hereinafter En-
hancing Governmental Productivity].
23. Id. The federal government enters into $43 billion worth of contracts with the
private sector each year. Contracts issued pursuant to A-76 comprise part of that figure;
however, OMB does not know the exact value of A-76 contracts. Hearings Before
Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13, at I (statement of Rep. Gary L. Ackerman).
24. Enhancing Governmental Productivity, supra note 22, at 3. This estimate is based





reviews.' '- The Administration estimates that programs reviewed
under the A-76 procedure that remain in-house achieve savings on
the average of 20% after adopting methods for improving efficiency
identified in the MEO.
26
Not only has the Reagan Administration heralded A-76 as an ef-
fective tool for cutting government expenditures, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) also has forecast substantial savings from the
A-76 program over both the short-run 27 and the long-run. There
are a number of reasons, however, to believe that the estimates of
the Administration and the CBO are inflated. Specifically, the Ad-
ministration has done a poor job of documenting actual savings or
losses from the program, in part due to agency intransigence and in
part because of the difficulties of calculating actual savings due to
the structure of the A-76 program. Because CBO must rely on the
Administration's savings estimates, its own calculations are likely to
be inflated as well.
CBO calculated its estimate of potential long-term savings from
the A-76 program on an accrual basis, the accounting method used
in generating cost comparison information under A-76 . 2  It esti-
mated that the A-76 program would result in $325 million worth of
cost reductions between 1988-92 if the current level of A-76 review
remains constant over that period. 29 CBO estimates savings of $650
million if A-76 reviews increase by 100% over the next five years.
30
CBO's savings estimates reflect cost reductions in two areas: reduc-
tions due to the relative efficiency of contractor performance versus
government performance, and reductions due to management im-
provements in government activities that, although reviewed, were
not contracted-out.
3 '
25. CBO, Contracting Out, supra note 11, at viii.
26. Id.
27. CBO estimated that at the current level of implementation, the federal govern-
ment could save $70 million in a single year. This near-term cash savings potential rep-
resents only about half' the estimated savings ($130 million) when measured on an
accrual basis. Id. at 19.
28. Id. at 17. The accrual method accounts for costs in the period in which they are
incurred without regard for when payment on the contract is actually made. Thus, esti-
mates of savings generated by A-76 using accrual accounting reflect, for example, sav-
ings in pension costs that result from federal employees who are laid off because their
jobs have been contracted-out. Id.
29. Id. at 23, Table 5.
30. Id. at 22-24.
31. Id. at vii-ix. See also Enhancing Governmental Productivity supra note 22, at 5
("Agencies must perform an internal management review of the in-house organization
to determine the most efficient and effective operation. . . . The knowledge that the
resulting plan will form the basis for cost comparison with commercial firms provides a
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Unfortunately, CBO data and calculations may be overly optimis-
tic. The savings data for activities converted to contract are them-
selves based on an estimate of past savings that have never been
verified and may never have materialized.3" A-76 does not require
agencies to provide post-contract audits to determine whether ex-
pected savings were actually realized after an activity was con-
tracted-out. Furthermore, the savings estimate for activities
remaining in-house is based on estimates contained in the MEO's-
not the agency's actual performance after an A-76 review. This in-
house data is as unreliable an indication of actual savings as are the
estimated savings due to conversion to contract. The data that CBO
used to estimate the cost-reduction potential of the A-76 program
are themselves merely estimates of potential savings. 33 So long as
post-audit information is sparse or unavailable, it is impossible to
know whether government agencies or private contractors are the
more efficient providers.
The baseline savings estimates yielded by the initial review cost
comparisons probably overestimate agency costs and underestimate
the cost of contracting-out for at least two reasons. First, the gov-
ernment may underestimate the amount of work federal employees
perform in providing a good or service. 34 Consequently, the agency
powerful incentive to develop innovative and less costly ways of meeting performance
standards').
32. CBO mainly relied on the Department of Defense's (DoD's) experience with the
A-76 program because civilian agencies have had little experience with the program to
date. CBO, Contracting Out, supra note 11, at 16. Based on DoD's experience, CBO
assumed that 655% of activities reviewed will be converted to contract and that those
remaining in-house could be expected to realize savings on the average of 20%. Id. at
28. Until 1986, however, D)oD reported savings from contract conversions as the difler-
ence between the agency's MEO and the contractor's bid. Hearings Before Human Re-
sources Subcomm., supra note 13, at 13 (testimony of Col. James Schroeder). According
to a report issued by the Army Inspector General in 1985, this method of estimating
savings from A-76 makes those estimates "'highly suspect." Id. (colloquy between Rep.
Gary L. Ackerman and Col..James Schroeder). The Inspector General's report, a copy
of which is on file with the House Subcomm. on Human Resources, has not been re-
leased to the public.
33. CBO's data is based on DoD experience between 1984-86. CBO, Contracting
Out, supra note I1, at 28. Yet DoD did not perform post-performance audits until 1986.
Other agencies, including OMB, do not seem inclined to gather that information either.
OMB recently computerized records of A-76 activities in all government agencies.
Although MEO estimates and contractor bids are available in the database, actual post-
performance costs are not. Hearings Before Human Resources Subcomm.., supra note
13, at 232-34 (colloquy among Rep. Gary L. Ackerman, William E. Mathis, Acting Ad-
ministrator, OFPP, and David Muzio, Deputy Associate Administrator, OFPP) (actual
costs are expected to be monitored by agency managers, and budget allocations ad-
justed downward to reflect projected savings).
34. This tendency to underestimate is illustrated by the few available studies of post-
performance contracting costs. For example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) re-




report setting forth the government's contract specifications leads
contractors to offer bids that are lower than the actual cost of pro-
viding the good or service and thus apparently low enough to move
production into the private sector. Second, the competition among
private firms for government contracts often results in contractors'
underbidding of the job.
The cost of contracting increases where contractors who underbid
a job are able to renegotiate their contracts or obtain judicial relief,
thereby adding unanticipated costs to the contract. If the govern-
ment makes an error in its contract specifications, private contrac-
tors may seek contract reformation or contract rescissioni 5 When a
contract is actually rescinded, the agency, stripped of its own capac-
ity to perform the work, must either reassemble its former capabili-
ties or open up the contract again for bids. Relief is also available
for contractors who underbid a job if the court finds that the gov-
ernment's acceptance of a contractor's bid was unconscionable.3"
by Dol) between October 1, 1978, and February 28, 1981. See GAO, DoD Functions
Contracted Out Under OMB Circular A-76: Contract Cost Increases and the Effects on
Federal Employees (Apr. 15, 1985). Although GAO reported savings on 17 of these
functions, all but one function experienced increases in contract cost. GAO attributed
cost increases in 12 of the 20 functions to ambiguities or actual errors in describing the
scope of work already being performed by government employees, which formed the
basis of the contractor's bid. Id. at 3-4.
35. Where contract requirements are ambiguous, a court interprets the contract in
favor of the contractor when each of four requirements are met: (1) the contract was
ambiguous; (2) the contractor sought to clarify known or potential ambiguities; (3) the
contractor's interpretation of the ambiguity was reasonable; and (4) the contractor rea-
sonabh relied on the interpretation. See M.G.C. Company, 86-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,571
(Nov. 25, 1985).
36. In cases where the contractor seeks rescission on the ground that his accepted
bid contained an error, the legal standard is whether the government knew or should
have known of the error. If the court finds that the contracting officer had actual or
constructive knowledge of an error in a bid, the court will find the government's accept-
ance of the bid to have been "unconscionable" and will grant the contractor relief. See
Rtggiero v. United States, 420 F.2d 709, 713 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Frhe common indicia of
constructive knowledge, especially in cases where a mistake is not apparent on the face
of the bid, is whether a contractor's low bid is in line with the bids of other contractors,
with the government's estimated in-house costs, and with the government's experience
with previots contractors performing similar work. Sol-Mart Janitorial Services, 87-2
B.C.A. (CCH) 19,713 (1987) (variation of 13.4% between contractor's bid and gov-
ernment's estimate of cost of procuring service put government on notice of a mistake in
bid); Figgie International, Inc., Badger-Powhatan Division, 83-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 16,421
(1983). Bi cf Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F. 2d 961 (Ct.CI. 1965) (gov-
ernment did not have constructive knowledge despite 125% variance between bids).
Where there is a reasonable explanation for disparity between bids, the inference of
error is negated. All American Poly Corporation, 84-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,682 (1984).
Under the business judgment rule, however, relrmation or rescission of a govern-
ment contract is not allowed where a contractor deliberately underbids a job to beat out
the competition, SCM Corporation, 85-I B.C.A. (CCH) i 7,783 (1984), or simply mis-
estimates the cost of performance. Superior Services, 84-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,547
(1984); Overhead Electric Company, 85-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 18.026 (1985). But cf )on
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To the extent that a contractor obtains relief from the contract, an
agency fails to realize some or all of the savings from privatization
anticipated by the agency in its initial A-76 comparison between pri-
vate costs and government costs. In some cases, the ultimate cost of
private sector production may exceed the cost to the government
had the activity remained in-house. The lack of adequate post-per-
formance data also makes it difficult to evaluate how often contrac-
tors have succeeded in obtaining post-award reformation or
rescission of a contract. The law of government contracting is sui
generis; the basic rule appears to be that the government must often
bear the risk of error.37 There are numerous cases in which an
overly zealous contracting officer accepted a low, apparently respon-
sive bid that the courts subsequently decided was so disproportion-
ate to other bids, or so out of line with the government's knowledge
of costs, that acceptance of the bid was deemed "unconscionable. 38
It would appear that the incidence of post-award relief could in-
crease as pressure increases on agencies to contract-out their com-
mercial activities.
Despite these indications that the savings estimates proffered by
the Administration and by the CBO fail to take full account of the
costs of contracting-out, the estimates are often used to suggest that
decreases in federal expenditures are attainable through con-
tracting-out. A closer look at the estimates reveals that critical ques-
tions remain unanswered: Can the competitive discipline of the
private market be superimposed on a government bureaucracy?
And can bureaucratic incentives be restructured to encourage agen-
cies to agree to more contracting-out?
C. Preserving Competition in a Bureaucratic Setting.-
A Prerequisite for Efficiency
Savings from private sector production do not result from the
mere fact that goods and services are being produced in the market,
but from the presence of competition in the market. Price competi-
tion among government contractors ensures that contractors will
produce goods and services in the most efficient manner possible,
Simpson, 86-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,768 (1986) (where government fails in its verifica-
tion duties, rescission may be granted even if error due to mistake in business judg-
ment). For an excellent treatment of the types and standards of relief available to
government contractors, see generally Hagberg, Mistake in Bid, Including New Proce-
dures Under Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 13 Pub. Contr. L.J. 257 (1983).
37. See supra note 35.




and will sell them to the government at the lowest price possible.39
Absent competition, contracting-out simply replaces one bureau-
cracy with another. Unfortunately, there are a number of forces at
work that tend to move government contractors into a monopolistic
position, thereby leading to increased costs over the long run.
One such anticompetitive tactic is a contractor "buy-in." 40 A buy-
in occurs when a contractor deliberately underbids ajob to get the
government contract and then recoups its initial loss by expanding
the work under the contract for a higher price. 4' Another anticom-
petitive measure is the widespread use of the "umbrella" contract.
An umbrella contract consolidates several agency functions into a
single contract; the winning contractor typically performs only a
portion of the contract itself and subcontracts out the other activi-
ties. This contracting technique introduces three problems. First,
the introduction of a prime contractor as a "middleman" increases
the cost of performing a specific function. Second, because only a
limited number of large firms have the resources to compete for um-
brella contracts, the government loses the benefit of active competi-
tion from smaller firms. 42 Third, the introduction of a prime
contractor complicates the agency's job of monitoring the subcon-
tractors' performance.
There is an additional threat to free market competition in the
government contracts market. Although the Federal Acquisition
Regulations43 require competitive bidding in most instances, many
government contracts are awarded noncompetitively or with few
contractors bidding. The competition is further impaired when con-
tracting officers often develop close relationships with certain con-
tractors and structure Requests for Proposals with those contractors
in mind.
4 4
39. This premise forms the basis of the economic theory of privatization, which is
basically a revival of the free market liberalism that defined the economic policies of the
United States prior to the New Deal. See Moe, Exploring the Limits of Privatization, 47
Pub. Admin. Rev. 453, 459 n.1 (1987).
40. J. Hanrahan, Government by Contract 30-31 (1983).
41. A review of the few post-performance cost audits indicates that this practice is
indeed prevalent. The GAO study attributed cost increases in five of twenty activities
studied to work added to the contract subsequent to award. See GAO, DoD Functions
Contracted Out Under OMB Circular A-76, supra note 34, at 3-4.
42. See Hearings Before Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13, at 269 (state-
ment of the Graphics Industry Association).
43. See 48 CFR § 1.000-53.303-WH-347 (as revised 1987).
44. See Hanrahan, supra note 40, at 29-32. See also Brian-Bland & Rasor, Lies. Half-
Truths, and Misrepresentations: How the Military Gets its Money, 5 Yale L. & Pol. Rev.
102, 104 (1986).
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Competition between the agency and private contractors is also a
key component in reducing government costs for activities that are
not, ultimately, contracted-out. While it is possible to simulate mar-
ket conditions at the time of A-76 review, the agency is not sub-
jected to continuing price competition. Although the agency is
expected to implement reforms set forth in the MEO, no mechanism
presently exists for ensuring that those changes are made. A-76 re-
quires review of the activity every five years; the agency continues to
operate without the immediate threat of competition during the
five-year period. When the activity is next subjected to A-76 review,
the agency's past performance is not used in the comparison; rather,
a new MEO is used. The Administration, however, has been im-
pressed by what are likely inflated claims of increased efficiency in
government activities that remain in-house after A-76 review, and
thus has placed an increased emphasis on A-76 as a productivity im-
provement program. 45 A proposal to expand the A-76 competitive
process to allow other federal agencies, in addition to private con-
tractors and the soliciting agency, to bid on A-76 contracts is one
OMB effort toward this end. 46 Of course, the problem with includ-
ing other government agencies in the A-76 bidding process is that if
a competing agency wins, the activity will be performed by an
agency for which price competition is not a continuous incentive for
efficiency.
Some theorists and policymakers associated with the privatization
movement view such artificial attempts to graft market incentives
onto a bureaucratic institution as fundamentally flawed. 4 7 Accord-
45. Hearings Before Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13, at 254 (testimony
of David L. Muzio, Deputy Associate Administrator, OFPP) ("Prior to 1979 [A-761 could
be definitely classified as a contracting-out policy. Since 1979 and with the modifica-
tions in 1983 and 1984, that basic philosophy has changed to one of competition be-
tween the private sector, where capable of performing the service, with Government
employees to determine who is the most capable"). Emphasis on management improve-
ments for activities remaining in-house after A-76 review is just one OMB effort toward
improving productivity.
46. OMB, Memorandum on Improving Productivity Through Use of Circular A-76,
Sept. 27, 1984, reprinted in 42 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 479 (Oct. 1, 1984).
47. This position was succinctly expressed by Madsen Pirie:
When governments become aware of inferior performance of public sector supply,
the attempt is sometimes made to graft onto the public program some of the effi-
ciency-making expertise of the private sector. It is an attempt to use the methods
which the private sector induces spontaneously because of its need to remain com-
petitive and profitable. The effort is commendable but of temporary effect. When
the novelty has died, the orthodox practices of the public sector reassert their ef-
fects. Streamlined business practices are an outgrowth of streamlined business.
The one thing difficult to introduce is the incentive that will sustain these practices.
In the private sector it is the pursuit of profit itself which ultimately serves that end.




ing to these theorists, the flaw is inherent in the structure of the
bureaucracy itself. In government bureaucracies, market-deter-
mined costs for failure are not a daily reality. Instead, the demo-
cratic political process in which bureaucracies operate biases them
toward inefficiency in several ways. First, politicians are principally
concerned with "enhancing [their] power, protecting [their] perks
and getting reelected." 48 Second, the class of beneficiaries and near
beneficiaries of government programs is generally smaller and more
organized than the taxpayers who pay for those benefits. Accord-
ingly, assuming the overriding goal for politicians is reelection,
there is an irresistible incentive to create or expand programs that
mollify vocal interest groups, especially when costs can be dispersed
or hidden through deficit financing.
49
The previous two factors speak to inefficiency in the decision to
provide a good or service. The third factor, which is more pertinent
to the A-76 context, is the inefficiency inherent in actual production
by bureaucracies. Bureaucrats can enhance their pay, power, and
prestige by increasing the size of their budgets instead of increasing
efficiency and enhancing the value of public assets. 50 In addition,
because the salaries of government employees are limited by stat-
ute, bureaucrats do not have the equivalent profit-related bonus as
an incentive to maximize efficiency.
5'
Whether the A-76 program can generate the efficiencies claimed,
but not adequately documented, by the Reagan Administration de-
pends on the ability of the Administration to preserve and foster
competition among contractors and its ability to replicate competi-
tive conditions within government agencies if the activity remains
in-house. Given the preexisting incentive structure of government
48. Banks,"A Talk with the Nobel Laureate," Forbes, Nov. 17, 1986, at 108 (quoting
James Buchanan). Buchanan is cited not as a privatization advocate, but as an originator
of the public choice theories that form the theoretical foundation of the privatization
movement.
49. See S. Butler, supra note 2, at 14-15.
50. See generally W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971).
Moreover, bureaucrats can advance their own careers in the way they allocate staff and
resources under their control, allocations that do not necessarily promote efficiency in
production. Niskanen is cited not as a privatization advocate, but as an originator of the
public choice theories that form the theoretical foundation of the privatization
movement.
51. Bureaucrats tend to adopt policies that lighten their work load and make their
jobs more pleasant and less stressful. For instance, they tend to seek easily adminis-
trable standards for dispensing outputs and respond to strong interest groups and poli-
ticians. Hanke, supra note 6, at 7. See also The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost
Control, War on Waste 151 (1984) (identifying three sources of inefficiency in govern-
ment production). [hereinafter Grace Commission Report].
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bureaucracies, replicating competitive conditions over the long-run
is unlikely, especially if the Reagan Administration fails to institu-
tionalize the program.
D. The Difficulties of Institutionalizing the A-76 Program
The most serious obstacle to the long-term success of the A-76
program is the complete discretion agencies have in deciding what
activities potentially may be contracted-out. 52 It is the agency that
makes the initial determination that an activity is commercial or gov-
ernmental in nature, and it is the agency that performs the cost com-
parison. And it is managers and workers within those agencies who
are the most vocal opponents of the A-76 process. 53 Indeed, the
Administration's current plans for A-76 jeopardize approximately
226,000 federal jobs. 54 Given the resistance of federal employees to
the A-76 review process, the Administration must take steps to
either restructure incentives toward review, or counteract that
resistance with alternative procedures.
The Administration has proposed some measures to make the A-
76 review process less threatening to federal employees. For exam-
ple, it has proposed contracting-out certain activities to business
ventures formed by federal employees displaced by A-76. These
programs, however, are only in their formative stages, and their suc-
cess remains to be seen. Federal employees may not be willing to
surrender the security that government employment offers in ex-
change for the promise of a risky business venture.
While the Administration advocates expanding the number of A-
76 reviews conducted, it steadfastly has refused to implement one
proposal that could broaden the types of activities eligible for A-76
review by bypassing employee resistance. Representative Gary Ack-
erman, Chair of the House Civil Service Subcommittee on Human
Resources, which is responsible for oversight of A-76, has argued
that there is a need for government-wide guidelines for deciding
which types of activities currently performed by the government
should be considered commercial and which types should be consid-
52. Statutory exemptions and exemptions within A-76 place minimal limitations on
agency discretion. See supra note 14.
53. See, e.g., American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, AFI.-
CIO, When Public Services Go Private: Not Always Better, Not Always Honest, There
May Be A Better Way (1987); Hearings Before Human Resources Subcomm., supra note
13, at 36-53, 56-59, 61-70, 71-81, 136-66, 275-79 (statements of various managers and
employee organizations).




ered inherently governmental. 55 Since agencies have complete dis-
cretion in categorizing activities, a common result is that the same
function is categorized as "governmental" in one agency and "com-
mercial" in other agencies; 56 in fact, different geographic offices of
the same agency have reached contradictory conclusions as to the
nature of the activity under review. 57 Clearly, the distinction be-
tween commercial and governmental activities is highly manipulable
and susceptible to agency tinkering.
Ackerman's proposal could lead to less contracting-out if the
guidelines for defining commercial activities are narrowly drawn. It
is more likely, however, that government-wide guidelines would re-
sult in more contracting-out, particularly if the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) were charged with supervising, devel-
oping, and implementing the guidelines. Unlike OMB and GAO, for
whom enforcement of A-76 is just one of a number of responsibili-
ties, the principal responsibility of OFPP is to advance the goal of
55. Hearings Before Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13, at 207 (statement
of Rep. Gary L. Ackerman). See also House Panel Questions Amount of Savings from
Contracting Out, 44 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1085 (Dec. 23, 1985).
56. Also, an agency may designate a function as "commercial" in an initial review yet
reclassify that function as "governmental" in a subsequent review, or vice versa. For
example, an A-76 review of activities at the Directorate for Ammunition Operation at
Letterkenny Army Depot in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, which receives, stores, main-
tains, issues, and demilitarizes ammunition for the State Department, and for the DoD,
concluded that the directorate was engaged in governmental activity. This initial A-76
determination, however, was reviewed in 1982 under the direction of a new commander
to determine whether ammunition operations at Letterkenny were mislabeled in the ini-
tial review. That the same agency sought to reclassify the same activity differently in
separate A-76 review can only be explained by the broad discretion conferred by A-76 at
the activity level. Between the time of the two reviews, there had been no change in the
scope of the directorate's mission; there had only been a change in commanders. Hear-
ings Before Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13, at 23, 35. See also Arrowhead
Metals Ltd. v. United States, U.S. Cl. Ct. No. 291-85C (Sept. 19, 1985), reported in 44
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 729 (Oct. 14, 1985) (private contractor's challenge to Denver
Mint's cancellation of an Invitation for Bids for production of blanks used in making
coins denied; factors in agency's decision whether to contract-out function not limited to
price; agency may also rely on reevaluation of whether coinage of money is within gov-
ernment function prohibition of A-76).
57. The Administration prefers leaving determination of the nature of the activity to
agency discretion because, in a few agencies, activities commonly regarded as commer-
cial in nature may implicate indisputable governmental functions, such as national secur-
ity. For example, data processing performed at the Department of Health and Human
Services may in fact be commercial in nature while data processing at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is not. The Administration contends that the agency is in the best posi-
tion to know the implications of contracting-out a particular activity. Hearings Before
Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13, at 240 (statement of David L. Muzio, Dep-
uty Director, OFPP). Nonetheless, broad guidelines might be attempted, with a provi-
sion for appeals to the OFPP if contract procurement of a particular activity impairs the
agency mission or implicates national security. See also "NASA Not Conducting Cost
Comparison Studies Required by A-76, GAO Reports," 44 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1003
(Dec. 9, 1985).
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private procurement. But at present OFPP has no power to enforce
agency implementation of A-76. 58 By giving some enforcement
oversight to an agency with a privatization mission, the Reagan Ad-
ministration could establish, with some permanence, a counter-
vailing political force to reckon with agencies and future
administration officials whose own agendas would not include ag-
gressive use of A-76. Additionally, the Administration could institu-
tionalize its A-76 goals by pressing Congress to enact the A-76
policy into law.
59
Not only is it easy to manipulate the classification of a government
function, but also it is easy to manipulate financial data in the review
process. According to Bun Bray, former Executive Director of the
Federal Managers Association, " 'the A-76 procedure is so flexible
you can skew the data to fit your desired results.' "o The flexibility
of the data thus allows future Administrations, and even officials in
the current Administration who do not share the President's com-
mitment to increased contracting-out of commercial activities, to
thwart the use of the A-76 procedure.
The Reagan Administration certainly has advanced the use of Cir-
cular A-76 further than any previous administration. It has failed,
however, to institutionalize the A-76 policy, leaving the determina-
tion of what should be contracted-out to forces generally opposed
to the policy. So long as the Reagan Administration remains in of-
fice, these forces can be partially overcome; but the discretion that
remains at the agency level, among other factors, calls into doubt
whether the A-76 policy will be aggressively pursued by subsequent
administrations.
58. Presently, oversight of Circular A-76 is divided between GAO and OMB. The
OFPP has little authority of its own to enforce A-76 . OFPP's statutory authority is set
forth at 41 U.S.C. § 401-15 (1987 as amended). OFPP has no authority to 'impair or
interfere with the determination by executive agencies of their need for, or their use of'
specific property, services, or construction .. " Id. at § 405(c)(1), The Grace Commis-
sion proposed establishment of an Office of Federal Management to promote con-
tracting-out of commercial activities. Grace Commission Report, supra note 5 1, at 151.
59. Senator Gordon Humphrey has introduced a bill requiring executive agencies to
contract-out commercial activities. S. 265., 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S525
(1987). Rep. Robert Smith introduced similar legislation requiring the federal govern-
ment to contract-out commercial activities whenever a cost comparison demonstrates
that the activity can be performed at a lower cost by the private sector. H.R. 1606.,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. H1290 (1987).
60. Hearings Before Human Resources Subcomm., supra note 13, at 69 (statement of
Bun Bray, former Executive Director of the Federal Managers Association, citing coin-




III. Federal Credit Programs
Unless one is willing to assume that the private sector, acting
within the same institutional framework as the government, is an
inherently more efficient producer than the government, the A-76
program is difficult to endorse as an efficiency measure. Even
harder to justify on grounds of increased efficiency, however, is the
Administration's privatization policy in the area of federal credit
programs, where the goal of increased efficiency is a guise for ideo-
logical preference.
President Reagan's FY 1988 budget includes three privatization
measures directed at federal credit programs: (1) sale of loan assets
from a variety of portfolios accompanied by a gradual reduction in
monies available for new federal direct and guaranteed loans;
(2) fundamental reform of budgetary treatment of federal credit
programs; and (3) gradual increases in interest rates and fees at-
tached to government loan programs. 6' These proposals attempt to
correct inefficiencies in the supply of credit, a different problem
than that targeted by the A-76 program. The Administration hopes
to move the decision of how much credit to supply, and to whom to
supply the credit, to the private market. Moving the allocative deci-
sion to the private sector presents more, difficult political problems
than moving the production function to the private sector. To ap-
preciate the implications of these proposals, a brief description of
the government's involvement in credit markets is useful.
A. Forms and Extent of Government Involvement in Credit Markets
The federal government intervenes in credit markets through two
principal mechanisms: (1) loan subsidy programs and (2) asset ex-
change programs designed to develop and facilitate secondary loan
markets. There are two different types of programs that, in effect,
subsidize the cost of borrowing: programs providing direct loans
from the federal government and programs under which the federal
government guarantees privately secured loans. In direct loan pro-
grams, the government originates and services the loan. Normally it
does not charge the borrower an interest rate high enough to cover
servicing costs and the cost incurred by the Treasury in financing
the loan. Thus, direct loans result in a subsidy benefit to the bor-
rower and a subsidy cost to the government.62 When the federal
61. OMB, 1988 Budget, supra note 4, at Supp. 2-36-38.
62. The government subsidizes direct loans through a variety of favorable terms:
(1) below-market interest rates; (2) longer maturity periods; (3) interest deferral;
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government guarantees privately originated loans or holds private
loans against default, the government assumes either partial or total
liability for the principal and interest if the borrower defaults. As a
result, the privately set interest rate charged the borrower is re-
duced substantially. Like direct loans, loan guarantees usually in-
volve a significant subsidy benefit to the borrower and a significant
cost to the government, paid out when an insured borrower
defaults.
The federal government also participates in the secondary credit
market through five private financial institutions, termed "govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises" (GSEs). 63 Although most GSEs were
chartered and established by the federal government, all have been
privately owned since 1969.64
GSEs channel credit to segments of the economy designated by
the government, such as housing, agriculture, and education. This is
done by government creation of a subsidized secondary credit mar-
ket for loans extended to these favored segments. By selling an
equivalent amount of public securities, GSEs finance the purchase
of, for example, existing housing, educational, and agricultural
loans from direct lenders. 65 In purchasing the loan assets of private
institutions on favorable terms, GSEs enable private institutions to
(4) waiver or reduction of loan fees; (5) insufficient collateral; and (6) grace periods for
repayment. OMB, Special Analyses, supra note 12, at F-32.
63. The five GSEs are: the Farm Credit System (FCS), the Federal Home Loan Bank
System (FHLB), the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or "Fannie Mae"),
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Freddie Mac"), and the
Student Loan Marketing Association (SLMA or "Sallie Mae"). Id. at F-22. See also infra
note 65.
64. OMB, Special Analyses, supra note 12, at F-22.
65. For example, Freddie Mac, which is owned by savings and loans institutions, was
established by Congress in 1970 to increase the liquidity and availability of mortgage
credit in the residential mortgage market. Freddie Mac buys non-federally insured
mortgages from the mortgage bankers, savings institutions, and commercial banks that
originated the loans by issuing debt or by issuing pass-through certificates backed by
mortgage pools. Fannie Mae was created in 1938 to provide a secondary credit market
for residential mortgages underwritten by the federal government, such as loans insured
by the Federal Housing Administration and loans guaranteed by the Veteran's Adminis-
tration; it operates in much the same way as Freddie Mac. Debt issued by Fannie Mae is
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Sallie Mae was created by Congress in 1972 to
increase the liquidity of government-insured student loans, thereby expanding fmnds
available to lenders for additional loans. Sallie Mae uses two methods for increasing
liquidity. One method is the direct purchase of insured student loans; Sallie Mae as-
sumes title to the loan, and borrowers repay Sallie Mae. Alternatively, lenders can bor-
row from Sallie Mae. These latter loans, known as "warehouse advances," are secured
by student loan portfolios. Lenders retain title to the loans and repay the principal plus
interest to Sallie Mae. See generally Moran, The Federally Sponsored Credit Agencies:




increase the liquidity of their assets, thereby allowing them to make
additional loans to the favored segments.
Since GSEs are privately owned, they are not included in the uni-
fied budget or the credit budget. 66 But because they receive
favorable tax, regulatory, and financial treatment from the federal
government, GSEs enjoy a significant advantage over other private
participants in secondary credit markets. 67 As a result, securities is-
sued by GSEs typically yield anywhere from 1/2%-3% below me-
dium-rated corporate debt. 68 Although the government does not
actually secure debt issued by GSEs, the many regulatory advan-
tages accorded GSEs contribute to the perception that GSE debt is
extremely secure.
The federal government's involvement in credit markets, through
both direct and guaranteed loan programs and through the secon-
dary credit market, is extensive. The actual volume of outstanding
government direct loans totaled $252 billion in FY 1986.69 The
same year, the volume of the government's contingent liability
under guaranteed loan programs totaled $450 billion.70 And, in FY
1985, the volume of loan assets held by government-sponsored en-
terprises totaled $418 billion. 7' Between the years 1980-85, the fed-
66. OMB, Special Analyses, supra note 12, at F-22.
67. Id. at F-24, Table F-9 lists just some of the benefits GSE status confers:
Line of credit
at T reasury .............................
Exemption of corporate
earn ings ................................
Exemption of interest income of investors










State banking laws .......................
Eligibility as collateral
for public deposits .......................
68. Id. at F-23.
69. Id. at F-32.
70. Id.
FHLB FHLMC FNMA FCS SLMA
* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Yes No No Yes No
• Yes No No Yes Yes
* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
• Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
71. B. Bosworth, A. Carron, & E. Rhyne, The Economics of Federal Credit Programs
4 (1986).
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eral government held or influenced one-third to one-half of the
funds in the credit market.
7 2
B. Traditional Justifications for Government Involvement
Two traditional arguments have been advanced in support of ex-
tensive government involvement in credit markets. The first argu-
ment directly addresses the Administration's contention that federal
involvement in credit markets results in inefficient supply decisions.
According to this argument, government involvement corrects mar-
ket imperfections, thereby increasing the efficiency of credit mar-
kets. 73 For example, many borrowers would not have access to
national credit markets were it not for the involvement of the federal
government. Federal regulations restrict interstate banking, leaving
borrowers to rely on local credit sources that may or may not be
available when a need for credit arises. Thus, savings may be dis-
tributed to less-preferred activities in some markets, while other
markets lack adequate resources to distribute funds to more pre-
ferred uses. Interest rates necessarily are higher in markets in which
resouces are scarce than in markets in which resources are plentiful.
Government involvement knits together local credit markets to
make more efficient use of savings. If credit markets are national in
scope, interest rates will vary only with the risk of default for a cer-
tain category of borrowers and with the administrative costs of
processing and servicing the loan. Government credit programs also
can correct imperfections in credit insurance markets. Private firms
are hesitant to insure loans where they cannot obtain enough infor-
mation about the borrower to adequately evaluate the risk. This
problem is particularly acute for small businesses and individuals.
Private firms also are reluctant to insure loans where borrowers can-
not offer collateral. This particular market imperfection is charac-
teristic of the student loan market. Thus, these types of loans have
no adequate resale market because of inadequate insurance and lack
of standardization in contract terms. GSEs provide a resale market
for these assets, and thereby enable private lenders to channel funds
to government-funded activities.
Second, government involvement through loan subsidies is justi-
fied as a method for reallocating resources to social goals not profit-
able enough to attract private investment. The government has
subsidized synthetic fuel production, low-cost rental housing, and
72. Id. at 5-6.




education through subsidized loan guarantees and direct loans
bearing an interest rate below the prevailing market rate.74 These
segments of the economy might not otherwise receive credit absent
government intervention in the market.
C. Reagan's Proposals for Privatizing Federal Credit Programs
The Reagan Administration has sought to promote supply effi-
ciency in federal credit programs through several different propos-
als. The proposals are directed at both primary and secondary
credit markets.
1. Privatization of Secondary Credit Aarkets The Reagan Admin-
istration currently is studying ways to privatize two GSEs-popu-
larly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 75  The precise
contours of this proposal are still being formulated by a subcommit-
tee of the President's Commission on Privatization. 76 The only spe-
cific proposal advanced by the Administration thus far is a
permanent limit on the volume of loan assets that all GSEs can
purchase.
77
According to the Administration, GSEs lead to a misallocation of
resources across all credit markets because sectors of the economy
that do not have GSEs acting as intermediaries tend to have less
financing available to them. This increases the cost of financing to
those sectors.78 Ironically, this argument for the privatization of
GSEs suggests the need for more government involvement, not less.
The argument that GSEs promote the misallocation of resources
among credit markets must be based on the premise that credit mar-
kets are highly individuated, with the flow of capital across markets
constrained. In a fragmented credit market, lenders prefer assets
with which they are familiar. For instance, savings and loans institu-
tions prefer mortgage assets because of these institutions' expertise
74. Bosworth, Carron, & Rhyne, supra note 71, at 9-10. The Rural Electrification
Administration (REA) is another loan subsidy program designed to promote the
purchase of a public good: specifically, the provision of electric and telephone services
to rural and farm areas. REA loans, when first offered, bore interest rates comparable to
those available in the private market. Over time, however, the extent of this subsidy was
altered as REA interest rates failed to keep pace with prevailing private interest rates.
OMB, Special Analyses, supra note 12, at F-33.
75. OMB, Special Analyses, supra note 12, at F-23. Since GSEs are already privately
owned, "privatization" in this context is more akin to deregulation.
76. The report of the President's Commission on Privatization was given to the Pres-
ident on March 1, 1988. The parameters of the Commission's proposals with regard to
federal credit programs do not differ significantly from those decesribed in this Current
Topic.
77. OMB, Special Analyses, supra note 12, at F-22-23.
78. Id.
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in valuing the asset, their knowledge of local markets, and the econ-
omies of scale that have developed. If markets are fragmented, bor-
rowers must compete for fewer capital resources than if markets are
nationally integrated. This means that interest rates are higher in
markets where resources are more scarce than in markets where re-
sources are more plentiful. If the problem is higher interest rates in
certain markets, as the Reagan Administration claims, the answer is
greater integration of markets. GSEs promote just such national in-
tegration. Moreover, "[t]o the extent that [GSEs] reduce transac-
tion costs, they do result in some reallocation of credit toward
sectors such as housing, but a shift of credit flows that results from
lower transaction costs improves the productivity of capital rather
than misallocates it." 70 Thus, limits on the activities of GSEs do not
lead to greater supply efficiency, as the Reagan Administration has
argued; rather, limits inefficiently reallocate credit according to the
caprice of the market.
2. Portfolio Sales President Reagan's FY 1988 budget pro-
poses a second measure for privatizing federal credit programs-an
expansion of the Administration's "pilot" program, begun in FY
1987, which authorizes the sale of existing government loan assets
to the private sector.8 0 President Reagan proposes selling loans
with a face value of $11.2 billion without recourse to private inves-
tors to produce offsetting receipts in the amount of $5.3 billion.
The Administration anticipates that the sale of these assets will re-
duce the deficit by $4 billion.8'
The pilot program appears to sacrifice good sense to the deficit
god. By selling a productive asset in the competitive market for less
than half its long-term face value, the Administration gains immedi-
ate, albeit costly, offsetting receipts in the year of the sale in order to
duck under deficit ceilings established by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
11.82 Moreover, by insisting that the loan assets be sold without re-
79. Bosworth, Carron, & Rhyne, supra note 71, at 8.
80. The Administration proposes to sell loans from the portfolios of the following
agencies: Farmers Home Administration, Rural Electrification Administration, Small
Business Administration, Housing and Urban Development, Department of Education,
the Export-Import Bank, Bureau of Reclamation, Health and Human Services, Depart-
ment of Transportation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. OMB, 1988 Budget, supra
note 4, at 2-44.
81. Although proposed loan sales will reduce the deficit by $4.2 billion in FY 1988,
savings realized from these sales will decline to $1.7 billion in 1989, to $800 million in
1990, to $300 million in 1991, and will be completely depleted by 1992. Committee on
the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1988
Budget, Serial No. CP-2 111-15 (Feb. 1987).
82. Deficit ceilings were established by Congress in 1985. Balanced Budget and




course, the President settles for a lower return on the sale than he
might otherwise have realized.83 The future savings that result from
reduction in Treasury debt, however, are eventually offset by loss of
future income from the assets sold.8 4
Even if the loan assets are sold, it is still the government that has
made the initial decision to allocate resources toward a particular
use by financing or arranging for financing of the loan. Thus, in
terms of the Administration's own views of efficient operation of the
credit market, funds are still being channeled to uses the private sec-
tor might not consider optimal. Standing alone, the Administra-
tion's pilot program appears to be an ill-conceived, short-term
deficit measure; but in conjunction with the President's proposals to
reform budgetary treatment of credit programs, at most it forms the
foundation for making expenditure reductions in federal credit pro-
grams more attractive to Congress.
3. The Long-Term Logic of Portfolio Sales The President's "Fed-
eral Credit Reform Act of 1987,"85 introduced in Congress last year,
suggests that the Administration may have in mind a larger, more
sophisticated political strategy for completely privatizing federal
loan programs than just a sudden transfer of loan assets to the pri-
vate sector-a strategy to compel Congress to cut credit programs
by restructuring Congress' incentives. The first step of the Adminis-
tration's strategy is to measure the subsidy built into federal loans
by comparing their face value to the price offered in the private mar-
22 (West Supp. 1987). In 1987, Congress raised the deficit ceilings set by Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings and excluded revenues derived from the sale of loan assets from be-
ing counted towards deficit reduction in the year sold. Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 1987 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News (101 Stat.) 754 [hereinafter Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II]. Nonetheless,
to the extent the sale of loan assets actually lowers the deficit, fewer expenditure reduc-
tions and fewer revenue measures will be required to meet the deficit ceiling set in the
following fiscal year. 133 Cong. Rec. H7707, H7710 (Sept. 21, 1987) (Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Comm. of Conference).
83. Review of OMB Guidelines for the Sale of Government Loan Assets, Hearing
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 5 (Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Rep. Chester Atkins).
84. See supra note 81.
85. The President's Federal Credit Reform Act was introduced in both houses of
Congress in 1987. H.R. 1754, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. H1513 (1987); S.
745, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S3108 (1987). Congress concluded that
more study was required and responded by adding provisions to Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings II. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II, supra note 82, at 787 § 212. The statute requires
CBO and GAO to study the operation of loan programs for FY 1987 and 1988 and
recommend more accurate methods of calculating costs to government of federal credit
programs, methods of comparing costs of credit programs to other forms of assistance,
and methods for improving the allocation of funds between credit programs and other
programs.
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ket by selling the portfolios on a nonrecourse basis. The Adminis-
tration has taken this first step with its pilot program of portfolio
sales. The second step, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1987, if
adopted by Congress, is to reform fundamentally the budgetary
treatment of federal credit programs.
Current budgetary treatment of federal direct and guaranteed
loan programs conceals the true costs of these programs to the fed-
eral government. The unified budget reports only the cash require-
ments of loan programs. Most loan programs are financed through
revolving funds within the sponsoring agency; that is, loan repay-
ments under a particular program are used to advance new loans.
Only if repayments fall short of new loan requirements does Con-
gress actually appropriate additional funds. More importantly, there
currently is no way of measuring the actual cost to the government
of a loan or a loan guarantee. The actual cost of a loan is the inter-
est subsidy included in direct loan programs, or in the case of guar-
anteed loans, the costs associated with default. Interest subsidies
are paid out over the life of the loan and are lumped together with
other interest payments in the unified budget. Thus, it is impossible
to identify the actual value of the interest subsidy through the uni-
fied budget. Loan guarantees, on the other hand, do not cost the
government anything unless default actually occurs. Thus, the sub-
sidy value of a loan guarantee does not appear in the unified budget
until and unless a defiult occurs sometime in the future. The Credit
Budget, adopted under the Carter Administration in 1980, is a
mechanism supplementary to the unified budget that measures total
credit commitments.8 6 The Credit Budget records the volume of
new loans issued, regardless of whether the sponsoring agency dis-
perses new loans through its revolving fund. However, the empha-
sis on the volume of new loan activity obscures the true cost to the
government of new loan activity-that is, the subsidy value of the
loan. The potential for hiding the true costs of loan programs in the
unified budget and the Credit Budget makes loan programs an at-
tractive option for politicians seeking to reallocate resources toward
social goals or to redistribute income.
President Reagan's credit reform proposal would make the sub-
sidy value of federal loan programs explicit.8 7 The proposal would
require federal agencies to pay the subsidy value of direct loans and
loan guarantees made each year directly into a central revolving
86. OMB, Special Analyses, supra note 12, at F-6.
87. The following description is based on Message from the President of the United
States, Proposed Legislation-"Federal Credit Reform Act of 1987," House Doc. 100-




fund to be established in the Treasury. The subsidy value of the
programs would be determined by the price obtained by the central
revolving fund's immediate sale of all direct loans in the private
market and purchase of insurance from private sources for govern-
ment guaranteed loans. The subsidy value of direct loans and loan
guarantees would have to be appropriated each year by Congress.88
By making the "value" of the subsidies explicit, the President
gains some leverage in promoting reductions in direct loan and loan
guarantee budget authority. Once the value of direct loans and loan
guarantees can no longer be hidden in the Credit Budget, the con-
flict in Congress over the social value of government loan programs
will necessarily increase and Congress will be forced to confront the
allocative choices it makes between financing loan programs and fi-
nancing other forms of governmental assistance. In a period of defi-
cit-driven budget politics, it is unlikely that federal credit programs
can be maintained at the same levels once the cost of government
credit subsidies is made explicit.
Although the President's credit reform proposal fundamentally
restructures the budgetary treatment of loan programs to induce ex-
penditure reductions in these programs, the proposal suffers from
the same problem that plagued the Administration's other attempts
to reduce the size and scope of the federal government through ex-
penditure reductions; it fails to create coalitions of lenders and bor-
rowers who can exert pressure on Congress to abandon federal
credit programs. Federal credit programs directly assist borrowers
to whom private lenders are ordinarily averse to extending credit.
The borrowers who currently benefit from federal credit programs
are a more discrete group than those who might gain from the dif-
ferent type of allocative decision the private sector might make.
Since the losers are easy to identify, and the winners are unknown
and diverse, the borrowers who would benefit from the allocative
decision of the private sector have less incentive to pressure Con-
gress to abandon certain programs than those discrete groups such
as students, farmers, and small businesses, that stand to lose consid-
erable tangible benefits if the government abdicates to the private
88. Loan subsidies can be measured in one of two ways: (1) the subsidy cost to the
government; or (2) the economic subsidy or value to the borrower, (he method pre-
ferred by the Reagan Administration. See Review of OMB Guidelines for the Sale of
Government Loan Assets, Hearing Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations 40 (Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Charles Bowsher, Comptroller Gen-
eral). Sale of loan assets in the private market, however, do not accurately measure the
subsidy value to the borrower. The amount private investors in the secondary market
are willing to pay depends on their familiarity with the type of loan offered and the
quality of documentation. Subsidy estimates based on the price received in the private
market therefore are inflated. Id.
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sector. In summary, portfolio sales and reform of the budgetary
treatment of federal loan programs do not advance the goal of
privatization any more than would a regular expenditure cut.
Conclusion
The Reagan Administration justifies its privatization measures
purely on grounds of efficiency. The political repercussions and the
allocative effects of privatization measures differ, however, with the
type of inefficiency the specific initiative is designed to correct. In
the case of contracting-out under the A-76 program, the Adminis-
tration is principally concerned with productive efficiency; its initia-
tives in the arena of federal credit programs are concerned with
allocative efficiency. None of these measures unequivocally can be
said to correct the perceived inefficiencies at which they are
targeted.
The Administration attempts to justify its aggressive use of the A-
76 program as a way of procuring goods and services at lower cost.
In other words, the emphasis of the A-76 program is on efficient
production through private-sector procurement or increased effi-
ciency in government production through imposition of competitive
incentives on government bureaucracies. Although the Administra-
tion and CBO claim substantial savings from the program, both re-
alized and potential, the savings estimates and projections are based
on highly unreliable and incomplete data. Moreover, there is evi-
dence to suggest that the benefits of competition among private-
sector firms dissipate over time, with private firms moving into the
same monopolistic position occupied by government bureaucracies
before them. As a management improvement technique for activi-
ties remaining in-house, the A-76 program does an even poorer job
of imitating competitive conditions.
The President's privatization initiatives in the areas of secondary
credit markets and direct and guaranteed loan programs are pro-
moted as a means of increasing supply efficiency. But supply effi-
ciency, in this case, is a euphemism for ideological choice.
Imposition of ceilings on the purchase of loan assets by GSEs un-
dermines national integration of loan markets, thereby increasing
allocative inefficiency instead of correcting it. Portfolio sales likewise
do nothing to promote allocative efficiency, even assuming that the
government is making poor allocative choices now. Currently, when
a loan asset is sold, it is the federal government, and not private




population is to receive credit. Even if the Administration is suc-
cessful in reforming budgetary treatment of federal loan programs
using portfolio sales as the mechanism for measuring subsidy val-
ues, it will have done nothing more than make expenditure reduc-
tions more likely.
In summary, contracting-out and the privatization of federal
credit programs cannot conclusively be shown to promote produc-
tive efficiency or efficient supply decisions. Privatization raises an
ideological issue about the proper role of the federal government.
Efficiency arguments should not be allowed to obfuscate the true
nature of the debate. Given the dubious claims of efficiency gains
due to contracting-out and privatization of federal credit programs,
these measures should not be pursued without serious considera-
tion of the values that underlie them.
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